BYU Law Review
Volume 1979 | Issue 2

Article 5

5-1-1979

Funded Adoption: A "Viable" Alternative to
Abortion
Frederick R. Vandeveer

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Family Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Frederick R. Vandeveer, Funded Adoption: A "Viable" Alternative to Abortion, 1979 BYU L. Rev. 363 (1979).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol1979/iss2/5

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Brigham Young University Law Review at BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in BYU Law Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

COMMENTS
Funded Adoption: A "Viable" Alternative
to Abortion

Since 1973, when the United States Supreme Court decided
Roe u. Wade1and thus "legalized" ab~rtion,~
the simple expedient of elective abortion has become the popular method of mastering an otherwise awkward situation-unwanted pregnancy. It
is impossible to estimate the number of American women who
accept the medical, social, and financial risks of both carrying to
term a pregnancy characterized as "unwanted" and then keeping
the child, for better or worse. Nevertheless, when motherhood is
not chosen, abortion is far more common than adoption-the
usual solution of an earlier generati~n.~
Even if a woman has justifiable reasons for rejecting the
1. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2. Roe u. Wade held that the power of the state to regulate abortion through criminal
statutes is limited by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. This limitation
is greatest during the first trimester of pregnancy, when a woman's right of privacy,
including the right to terminate her pregnancy upon consultation with her physician,
cannot be overridden by the state. As the pregnancy enters the second trimester, the
state's interest in promoting the health of the mother becomes compelling and regulations
reasonably related to protecting maternal health will be upheld. When the fetus finally
reaches the stage of viability, the state's interest in protecting the potential human life
becomes compelling, and the state may regulate or even prohibit abortions, except those
medically necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother. Id. at 164-65.
3. The number of legal abortions performed in the United States in 1977 was estimated at 1.3 million. Forrest, Tietze, & Sullivan, Abortion in the United States, 1976PERSPECTIVES
271, 272 (1978). Since 1973 the number of abortions in
1977, 10 FAM.PLAN.
the United States has risen steadily. Over five million abortions were performed between
1973 and 1977. Id.
According to an official from the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
(HEW), there were about 150,000 adoptions in 1973, the most recent year for which fairly
accurate data are available. Opportunities for Adoption Act of 1977: Hearings on S. 961
Before the Subcomm. on Child and Human Development of the Senate Comm. on Human
Resources, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1977) (statement of Saul Rossoff, Acting Director,
Office of Child Development, HEW) [hereinafter cited as S. 961 Hearings]. The figures
provided by HEW do not distinguish adoptions of newborn "unwanted" infants from
adoptions of other categories of children. More detailed data are available on adoptions
in 1971 and 1972. See Adoption and Foster Care, 1975: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Children and Youth of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. 591-618 (1975) (data collected by HEW) [hereinafter cited as Adoption and
Foster Care Hearings].
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heavy responsibilities of motherhood, she may find it difficult to
embrace the modern alternative. To her, abortion may seem a
repugnant and desperate course. Still, in a society oriented toward the simple and expedient, abortion has the advantage of
being a very pragmatic solution. To further weight the scales in
its favor, abortion is cheap relative to the high cost of pregnancy
and childbirth. For the woman with limited financial means, the
expensive alternatives may seem hopelessly remote, and abortion
looms as the only feasible option. As the field of alternatives
narrows, this woman, often without a supportive partner or family, may fear that a struggle against the insistent pressure of
circumstances pushing her toward abortion would be foolish or
financially disastrous. For the unexpectedly pregnant indigent
woman, economic reality is a harsh and insensitive dictator.
Legislative and judicial complications have seriously distorted the economic factors involved in the choice between abortion and the alternatives of motherhood or adoption. The pendulum of the law has swung both ways. The upswing came shortly
after Roe v. Wade, when states began to pay the costs of elective
abortions for indigent women, usually with federal funding under
Medicaid programs.' Within four years of Roe u. Wade nearly all
states paid for nontherapeutic abortions for Medicaid-eligible
women.5 In 1976 more than $60,000,000 from Medicaid and other
social services programs helped fund over a quarter-million abortions.' But as the pendulum returned, this generous source of
funds was severed. Amendments to the 1977, 1978, and 1979 congressional appropriations to the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) have cut off all federal funds administered by HEW that would otherwise go to pay for nontherapeutic
abortions.' In addition, in Maher u. Roe, the Supreme Court held
4. The Medicaid statute, title XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396139613 (1976), does not specifically require or prohibit the use of federal program funds for
abortions. Rather, it lists general categories of medical services that must be provided by
a participating state, permitting the state to limit or expand coverage within these general
categories. See note 72 infra; Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 444 (1977).
RPTR. (AGI) 11 (1976) (only four states did not
5. See 5 FAM. PLAN./POPULATION
provide Medicaid assistance for elective abortion a s of Feb. 1976); 3 FAM.
PLAN./POPULATION RPTR. (AGI) 113 (1974) (1974 study reported only ten states that restricted Medicaid for elective abortion).
h.
(AGI) 59 (1977).
6. 6 FAM.PLAN./POPULATION
7. Department of Labor and Health, Education, and Welfare Appropriations Act,
1979, Pub. L. No. 95-480, 4 210, 92 Stat. 1567 (1978); Continuing Appropriations, 1978,
Pub. L. No. 95-205, 4 101,91 Stat. 1460 (1977); Department of Labor and Health, Education, and Welfare Appropriation Act, 1977, Pub. L. No. 94-439, $209,90 Stat. 1418 (1976).
These amendments prohibit the use of appropriated HEW funds for abortions except
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that a state can constitutionally refuse to provide funding for
nontherapeutic abortions even though federal funds might be
available, and even though the state pays the cost of therapeutic
abortion or normal childbirth for eligible women? After the
Maher decision and Congress' funding cutoff, many states immediately followed the federal example.1°
It has been strongly argued that the cutoff of public funding
of elective abortions will have a serious detrimental effect on
indigent women.ll The initial pressure of economic reality will
easily extinguish hopes of attempting motherhood or adoption.
Furthermore, in many cases a low-income woman will be unable
even to scrape together enough cash for a private abortion.
Charitable institutions, if available, may provide help. But
without public or charitable support, economic pressure may
further violate the freedom of choice of a poor woman by forcing
her to submit to the physical and psychological dangers of
illegal, but cheap, "back alley" abortion12 or "black market"
-

- -

when the life of the mother is endangered. The 1978 and 1979 amendments also allow
funding in reported cases of rape or incest, or when serious physical health damage to the
mother would otherwise result.
The 1977 amendment (Hyde amendment) was enjoined from taking effect by Federal
District Judge John F. Dooling shortly after it became law. McRae v. Mathews, 421 F.
Supp. 533 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), vacated and remanded sub nom. Califano v. McRae, 433 U S .
916 (1977). The Supreme Court vacated and remanded to the district court after its
decisions in Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977), and companion cases, see note 123 and
accompanying text infra, for reconsideration in light of these new decisions. Califano v.
McRae, 433 U S . 916 (1977). Thereafter, Judge Dooling.issued a temporary restraining
order, which he eventually dissolved on Aug. 4, 1977, ruling that the Hyde amendment
would go into effect as soon as the Secretary of HEW issued regulations defining the
parameters of the abortion funds cutoff. McRae v. Califano, 6 FAM.PLAN./POPULATION
RPTR.(AGI) 58 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 1977).
HEW issued the required regulations, which were finalized after the Dec. 9, 1977,
passage of the 1978 appropriations amendment. 43 Fed. Reg. 4570 (1978) (to be codified
in 42 C.F.R. $6 50.301-.310, 441.200-.208; 45 C.F.R. 8 228.92).
8. 432 U.S.464 (1977).
9. Id. at 470, 480.
10. See 6 FAM.PLAN./POPULATION
RPTR.(AGI) 58 (1977). Within a few months of the
Maher decision, a majority of states had stopped payments for elective abortion. Id. In
addition, several states began legislative consideration of state bans on elective abortion
funding. See 7 FAM.PLAN./POPULATION
RPTR.(AGI) 10 (1978). Illinois became the first
state to' enact such a law following Maher. Act of Nov. 17, 1977, P.A. 80-1091, 8 1, ILL.
ANN.STAT.ch. 23, 8 5-5. (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979).
11. See, e.g., Beal v. Doe, 432 U S . 438, 455 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting); id. at
462 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Lincoln, Doering-Bradley, Lindheim, & Cotterill, The
Court, the Congress and the President: Turning Back the Clock on the Pregnant Poor, 9
207 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Lincoln]; Note, A Right WithFAM.PLAN.PERSPECTIVES
out Access? Payment for Elective Abortions After Maher v. Roe, 7 CAP.U.L. REV.483
(1978) [hereinafter cited as Right Without Access?].
12. Before Roe u. Wade, abortions performed by physicians were illegal in most
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adoption,13the only two "alternatives" remaining.
Opponents of the ban on publicly funded abortion thus raise
the spectre of widespread back alley abortion to frighten Congress
and the states into resurrecting funded elective abortion for poor
women.14Such a return to the previous state of affairs would tend
to alleviate part of the problem for indigent women who view
states. In the post-Roe v. Wade era, however, "illegal abortion" refers to the procedure
when performed by one other than a licensed physician. An illegally performed abortion
presents a much greater degree of danger to the woman because of uncontrolled, often
inadequate, medical care. Increased mortality from self-induced abortions, or abortions
performed by illegal abortionists, is likely. See Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 455 n.1 (1977)
(Marshall, J., dissenting); Lincoln, supra note 11, at 213; Right Without Access?, supra
note 11, a t 493.
Illegal abortions will presumably be less expensive than legal abortions obtainable in
the same area, simply as a matter of market competition. See 432 U.S. at 455 n.1 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
13. "Black market" adoption generally involves profiteering on the part of a
"brokerw-often an attorney or a physician-who contacts a pregnant woman interested
in placing her child for adoption. The broker also locates a couple hoping to adopt, usually
a couple that has been discouraged and unsuccessful at attempts to adopt through authorized agencies. The couple must be willing to pay cash, often many thousands of dollars,
to obtain a child. The broker handles the actual adoption arrangement. Although his "fee"
generally covers all medical and living expenses of the mother, plus any court costs, the
wolfs share is retained by him "for services." See generally Adoption and Foster Care
Hearings, supra note 3, at 26-36 (joint statement of Joseph H. Reid, Executive Director,
Child Welfare League of America, Inc., and Elizabeth S. Cole, Director, North American
Center on Adoption Special Project, Child Welfare League of America, Inc.); Article,
Black Market Adoptions, 22 CATH.LAW.48 (1976).
Black market "babyselling," while not always illegal, presents a difficult moral and
ethical problem. This is especially true since parents who adopt through the black market
have usually failed in earlier attempts to adopt through authorized agencies, often because
they lack suitability for the role of adoptive parents. See Adoption and Foster Care
Hearings, supra note 3, a t 32 (joint statement of Joseph H. Reid, Executive Director, Child
Welfare League of America, Inc., and Elizabeth S. Cole, Director, North American Center
on Adoption Special Project, Child Welfare League of America, Inc.).
Black market adoption should be distinguished from "independent" adoption placement, often referred to as "gray market" adoption. Independent adoption is placement
arranged outside agency channels, either by the mother herself, or perhaps by her clergyman, lawyer, or physician. The element of profiteering is absent. The adoptive parents
may have to provide some of the incidental expenses, such as reasonable lawyer's fees, or
in some cases a portion of the mother's medical expenses, but these costs are small when
compared to the cost of a black market adoption. Independent adoption may not provide
effective screening for suitability of potential adoptive parents, but being wellintentioned, it does not suffer from the immoral and unethical taint of the b l y k market.
See generally Grove, Independent Adoption: The Case for the Gray Market, 13 V u . L.
REV.116 (1967).
14. See, e.g., 124 CONG.
REC.H5357-59 (daily ed. June 13, 1978) (remarks of Rep.
Mikulski and Rep. Holtzman); Lincoln, supra note 11, at 213; Right Without Access?,
supra note 11, at 490, 493.
Another possible "spectre" for the pro-funding advocates could be black market
babyselling-an obvious, even profitable alternative for a desperately poor pregnant
women.

FUNDED ADOPTION

abortion as an acceptable solution to unwanted pregnancy. But
it would do nothing to help those financially limited women who
are morally opposed to abortion. For these women, there may be
no realistic alternatives. The subtle force of the societal, and
perhaps institutional, bias15 in favor of the simplicity and expediency represented by abortion tugs insistently. But when swelled
by the often severe economic pressure pushing inexorably in the
direction of illegal abortion and black market adoption, this force
becomes overwhelming.
It is the purpose of this Comment to suggest an acceptable
alternative for women caught between the societal and institutional pressure simply to terminate an unwanted pregnancy in
abortion, and the sometimes intense economic pressure that may
ultimately force them into black market adoption or illegal abortion. The alternative is publicly funded adoption. Such a program would cover the expenses of prenatal, natal, and postpartum care for the woman; infant health care; counseling and referral services; and all costs of adoption, including in selected cases
subsidies to adoptive parents. For low-income women, the totality of these costs might preclude adoption as a reasonable alternative to abortion. But with public financial assistance, adoption
may be the ideal solution for many women.16 Administered and
supported by federal and state agencies and private organizations, adoption could serve to counterbalance any abortion bias.
Furthermore, it would make illegal abortion the costly choice and
black market adoption unnecessary and senseless. Funded adoption would thus provide the acceptable alternative to abortion
15. Of course, such an institutional bias is extremely elusive and difficult to substantiate. The orientation of a specific agency or organization will naturally tend to reflect the
local climate-rural or urban, religious or eclectic, conservative or liberal. However, evidence of this bias at the federal level is suggested in a statement by Connie J. Downey,
Director of Women's Action Program, HEW, that the literal alternatives to abortion are
suicide, motherhood, and madness. Abortion Alternatives Cited in HEW Memo,
Washington Post, Nov. 27, 1977, a t A-2, col. 1 (quoting an internal memo from Ms.
Downey to HEW Secretary Joseph A. Califano, proposing the disbanding of an HEW task
force she headed to research alternatives to abortion).
On the other hand, the recent cutoff of public funding for abortion at both federal
and state levels may evidence a trend away from a pro-abortion bias, at least by institutions that are politically responsive. However, the regulations issued by HEW implementing the cutoff of federal funds are quite liberal in defining the "rape or incest" and the
"physical health of the mother" exceptions to the funding ban. See 43 Fed. Reg. 4570
REC.H5368-70 (daily ed. June 13, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Hyde
(1978). See also 124 CONG.
and Rep. Michel).
16. Effective family planning may, of course, be a better solution than either abortion
or adoption. However, the focus here is on those situations in which pregnancy is already
a reality-situations that for lack of prevention must seek after the cure.
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which motherhood, in a woman's personal circumstances, may
not.
This Comment will discuss several important considerations
bearing on legislative implementation of the funded adoption alternative. Section 11 details the concepts and components of a
complete and effective funded adoption program. Section I11 outlines the current stance of Congress with regard to the need for
abortion alternatives, and in particular discusses enacted and
proposed legislation that has involved the funded adoption alternative. Section IV examines existing laws and social services programs that presently provide, or have the capacity to provide,
funded adoption services. Finally, Section V briefly discusses
some additional issues of significance to a decision to enact a
funded adoption program-notably cost, difficulties of implementation, and constitutionality.

Funded adoption, as advocated by this Comment, would be
most workable as a state-administered program, financed in large
part through federal matching grants. A new title or subtitle to
the Social Security Act1' could serve as the legislative vehicle to
provide federal financial participation and congressional policy
guidelines. The Secretary of HEW would be responsible for implementation and specific regulation in disbursement of federal
funds to qualified state programs. Private nonprofit organizations
with qualified programs could also be eligible for federal funds.
States and private organizations would have discretion to tailor
the details of their programs to suit local needs, but the basic
federal pattern would need to include four essential components:
(1)counseling and referral services, (2) maternal health care, (3)
infant health care, and (4) adoption subsidy.

A. Counseling and Referral
The f i t necessary component of funded adoption is a refined counseling and referral network. Counseling services would
be the contact point for a woman seeking assistance under a
funded adoption program, perhaps upon referral from another
entity, such as her clinic or physician or another social services
organization. Once a woman gains access to the counseling network, she would be guided smoothly and comfortably through the
17. 42 U.S.C.fig 301-1397f(1976).
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entire program. In this regard it is very important to safeguard
against any tendency the program might have to overrule the
choices and personal values of the individual. Statutory or regulatory language, therefore, should require counseling staffs to disclose full details of the program, including the fact that receipt
of benefits imposes no obligation to participate fully in the program or follow through with the adoption.InMisunderstanding on
this point could seriously damage the value of the entire program.lTounseling must inform the woman of available benefits,
yet allow and encourage her to use her own judgment in deciding
whether to accept the alternative of funded adoption. In the event
she decides against the adoption alternative, the woman should
be guided out of the program and referred to other sources of
assistance where appropriate.
Counseling, available also to the woman's partner or family,
would be necessary to all stages-from initial contact with the
program, through pregnancy, childbirth, and the adoption process. After adoption, the emphasis would shift to the adoptive
family. An integrated counseling system would provide both continuity and the comfort of familiarity to program participants,
and would thus be vital to the overall effectiveness of the program.
In conjunction with the counseling system, an adoption referral network would also be necessary. Locating suitable adoptive
parents, the function of this network, would be greatly facilitated
if a nationwide computer referral network were d e v e l ~ p e d A
.~~
state, while administering the program within its own boundaries, would be able to draw from a national pool in matching
adoptive parents to child-no easy task considering the diversity
18. This type of "disclosure" caveat was included in S. 961, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 9;
103(a)(2), 123 CONG.REG.S17872 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1977) [hereinafter cited as S. 9611,
a Senate proposal that in several respects resembles funded adoption as advocated by this
Comment. See notes 44-50 and accompanying text infra. Provision of services under the
Senate proposal would occur only after the woman has "been informed in writing that the
acceptance of such services does not in any way constitute an obligation to proceed with
adoption." S. 961, supra, 5 103(a)(2).
19. The supporters of the S. 961 proposal, see note 18 supra, also feared such a
misunderstanding. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 167, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 40-41, reprinted in
[I9781 U.S. CODECONG.& AD. NEWS1029, 1057-58 [hereinafter cited as S. REP.NO. 951671; S. 961 Hearings, supra note 3, at 101 (statement of Mathew Ahman, Associate
Director, National Conference of Catholic Charities); id. at 163-64 (statement of National
Urban Leaguehnteragency Adoption Project).
20. Provision for implementing such a nationwide, computer-based system is found
in title II of the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment and Adoption Reform Act of 1978,
42 U.S.C.A. $ 5113(b)(3) (Supp. 1979).
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of factors, such as familial background, race, and health, that are
generally considered in the adoption process.
Together, the counseling and referral systems would function
to correlate the various components of the funded adoption programs, provide ready access to its benefits, and ensure comfortable transition through the stages of the program. An efficient
counseling and referral network, in order to fulfill these purposes,
must be appropriately funded, adequately staffed, and provided
with full access to all centrally promulgated guidelines and information.

B. Maternal Health Care
Without public or charitable assistance, a low-income
woman may be foreclosed from the adoption alternative simply
because she or her family cannot afford the doctor bills. Costs of
maternal health care are high,ll and the possibility of complications makes the financial risks much greater. A poor woman's
only route to adoption, if she is to escape these costs, may lead
through the black market. Thus, an essential element of funded
adoption is the provision of all pregnancy-related expenses, including the costs of prenatal, natal, and postpartum care.12
Funded adoption would be most effective if financial assistance for maternal health care were authorized and administered
directly through the program. The temptation would be strong to
simply cross over to one or more of the various existing medical
assistance programs, such as Medicaid," as a ready source of
funds. For the sake of maintaining the integrated and comprehensive nature of the funded adoption alternative, however, a
new framework for maternal health care assistance should be set
up, with eligibility requirements and other control aspects based
on the specific purposes of the funded adoption program.
21. See The Cost of Having a Baby, 1978, GOOD
HOUSEKEEPING,
Jan. 1978, at 170. This
article gives a regional breakdown of hospital, physician, and other normal pregnancy and
delivery medical expenses. Total average costs range from $924 (midwife delivery, New
York City) to $2520 (hospital delivery, Boston). The average cost nationwide is about
$1300-1500.
22. Although the major pregnancy-related expenses are medical, provision for further
incidental expenses, such as nutritional care, maternity wardrobe, and childbirth training
would also be appropriate. Additionally, pregnancy may make it difficult or impossible
for a woman to continue in a particular employment, especially in later months. In such
cases, the provision of "pregnancy disability" benefits might lessen the impact of this
income impairment.
23. For a discussion of some of these alternative sources of funding for maternity care,
see notes 73-76, 91-94 and accompanying text infra.

FUNDED ADOPTION

C. Infant Health Care
If adoption is planned, but adoptive parents are not readily
available, the significant costs of newborn infant care are normally paid by the natural parent or parents until adoption can
finally be arranged. These immediate costs can become a financial burden on a low-income woman and her family.
The burden of infant care is compounded drastically in the
event of health complications. For example, intensive care for a
premature baby could cost much more than an uninsured,
average-income family could afford, and would be an impossible
expense for low-income parents." Congenital or early-developing
health defects could also severely tax natural parents' financial
resources.
Funded adoption should provide assistance that meets the
expenses of child health carez5in order to remove a significant
economic barrier to the adoption alternative. The same apparatus that disburses maternal health care assistance could operate
to provide infant health care. Again, already existing alternative
sources of funds may prove tempting,26but the same argument
mentioned in regard to maternal health care applies. In order to
be comprehensive, a funded adoption program must be selfsustaining, depending on no collateral program for any of its essential component services.

D. Adoption Subsidy
Funding of the actual adoption process involves two types of
expenses. The first type consists of nonrecurring expenses, notably court costs, attorney fees, and agency fees.27Usually these
24. In an attempt to reduce costs and increase availability of specialized care for
high-risk pregnancies and premature infants, an experiment in regionalization of perinatal
centers and neonatal intensive care units (ICU's) is currently underway in parts of the
United States. Helping Hand for the Newborn, TIME,
Sept. 11, 1978, a t 93. Nevertheless,
"a newborn's stay in an intensive care unit can run into tens of thousands of dollars." Id.
A study of 75 premature infants (1000 grams or less) admitted to the Neonatal ICU a t
Cedars-Sinai Medical Center in Los Angeles showed average total cost for non-surviving
infants to be $14,236, while average total cost for surviving infants was $40,287. Pomerance, Ukrainski, Henderson, Nash, & Meredith, Cost of Living for Infants Weighing 1,000
Grams or Less at Birth, 61 PEDIATRICS
908, 909 (1978).
25. Child health care benefits, in addition to specific medical expenses, should include routine newborn and developing-infant care (for example, immunization and wellbaby checkups, diapers and clothing, nutritional care, and day care). In extreme cases,
provision could also be made under this heading for basic support costs (food and shelter).
26. For a discussion of some alternative sources of funding for child health care, see
notes 74, 91-94 and accompanying text infra.
27. The total amount of these nonrecurring expenses varies, depending on the type

.
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costs are assigned to the adoptive parents, and program funding
of these one-time expenses would serve the purposes of funded
adoption by removing this economic obstacle when it proved significant for a particular adoptive couple.
The second type of expense includes the child support expenses borne by the adoptive parents. Although these costs, as
well as the nonrecurring expenses, are not a direct economic burden to the natural mother or family, the indirect effect-possible
difficulty in finding adoptive parents with sufficient financial
resources-may serve as a deterrent to the adoption alternative.
As discussed in greater detail in Section IV,28the purposes of a
direct adoption subsidy to the adoptive parents are to create a
larger pool of potential adoptive parents and to ensure that all
children, despite special needs, handicaps, or other factors tending to discourage prompt placement, will be adopted as soon as
possible. Selective adoption subsidyn would allow couples with
lower incomes, but great desire and parental ability, to adopt."
Subsidies would be especially useful in alleviating the extra cost
burden on adoptive parents imposed by the special needs, medical or otherwise, of some children. Adoption subsidies cannot
substitute for love, but they can meet physical needs that loving
adoptive parents might not otherwise be able to provide.31
The importance of adoption subsidy becomes clear when it
is observed that adoptive placement of minority children may be
of adoption and the state where it occurs. Public agency adoption costs average from $200400; private agency, from $450-900; independent, from $1600-3400; and international,
THE ADOPTIONADVISOR
109-10 (1975).
from $850-1300. J. MCNAMARA,
28. See notes 99-101 and accompanying text infra.
29. Adoption subsidy would be selective in the sense that only some of the funded
adoption situations would include this final component, In the majority of cases adoption
could be accomplished without program subsidy because the newborn infant would be in
demand. Adoption subsidy would only be implemented as needed to ensure adoption in
unusual cases, particularly those where the infant has special medical or other needs.
30. More than three-fourths of all nonrelative adoptions (those not by stepparents or
other relations) in the United States are arranged by public or private adoption agencies.
Adoption and Foster Care Hearings, supra note 3, at 592, 596; J. MCNA~~ARA,
supra note
27, a t 45. Agencies have requirements for potential adoptive parents that include such
supra
factors as age, marital status, health, religion, and financial status. J. MCNAMARA,
note 27, at 51-56. Although financial requirements were often prohibitive for low- and
middle-income families in the past, the recent trend emphasizes the ability of adoptive
parents to manage well what they do have, rather than their specific income or wealth.
Id. a t 53, 103. In part, this trend toward flexibility in fmancial requirements for adoption
is a result of state adoption subsidies. Id. at 53-54.
31. There is no element of profit in adoption subsidy. The subsidy would cover only
those expenses of the child that the adoptive parents could not afford. An example would
be extreme medical expenses incurred from operations to correct a birth defect such as a
cleft palate.
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more difficult than placement of Caucasian children." Subsidies
would facilitate the adoption of minority children by expanding
the pool of adoptive parents to include more minority group coup l e ~Hopefully,
.~~
the inclusion of adoption subsidy as a component of funded adoption would inhibit any tendency of the program to be of less benefit to minority groups, who may be most
in need of the adoption a l t e r n a t i ~ e . ~ ~
Adoption subsidy is thus essential to an integrated program
of funded adoption because it ensures that children with special
medical or other needs, or minority children, will be readily
adopted. Without this assurance that her child will be adopted
by suitable, loving parents regardless of health, race, or other
factors, a woman may be unwilling to consider the funded adoption alternative.

E. Possible Additional Components of Funded Adoption
Funded adoption essentially benefits low-income women,
those who are most susceptible to economic pressure to submit,
against their moral and ethical scruples, to legal or illegal abor-

-

-

- -

-

-

-

-

32. Healthy nonwhite infants are not as difficult to place as they once were. See J.
MCNAMARA,
supra note 27, at 35-37. However, nonwhite children with physical handicaps
or other special needs are not readily adoptable. See Adoption and Foster Care Hearings,
supra note 3, at 438-43 (statements of Evelyn K. Moore, Executive Director, Black Child
Development Institute, and Alfred B. Herbert, Jr., Adoption Project Director, Black Child
Development Institute). Furthermore, minority awareness groups have recently come to
consider transracial adoption inappropriate, largely because it tends to denigrate a child's
supra note 27, at 37-38. See generally Adoption and
racial heritage. See J . MCNAMARA,
Foster Care Hearings, supra note 3, at 438 (statement of Evelyn K. Moore, Executive
Director, Black Child Development Institute). Because of the resultant hesitancy on the
part of agencies to arrange transracial placements, the bulk of minority child adoptions
must occur within minority communities. Recently developed black adoption programs
have had some success in placing black children with black families. See id. a t 440;
41 (1976) (SanDiego
Neilson, Tayari: Black Homes for Black Children, 55 CHILDWELFARE
Adoption Services program, Tayari, established to provide greater outreach to black community to increase adoption of black children). Nevertheless, there is still a great need
for more adoptions within the minority communities. See S. %l Hearings, supra note 3,
a t 159-60 (statement of National Urban Leaguehteragency Adoption Project); Haring,
501, 501-02 (1976); Haring, Adoption
Adoption Trends: 1971-1975, 55 CHILDWELFARE
Trends, 1971-1974, 54 CHILDWELFARE
524, 524-25 (1975). For a general discussion of the
problems encountered in transracial adoption, see J. MCNAMARA,
supra note 27, at 35-39;
WELFARE
180 (1974).
Katz, Transracial Adoption: Some Guildelines, 53 C H ~ D
33. See Katz, Subsidized Adoption in America, 10 FAM.L.Q.3, 5 (1976). See generally S. 961 Hearings, supra note 3, at 158, 164 (statement of National Urban League/
Interagency Adoption Project).
34. See Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438,459-60 & nn.3 & 4 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting);
Forrest, Tietze, & Sullivan, Abortion in the United States, 1976-1977, 10 FAM.PLAN.
PERSPECTIVES271, 274-75 (1978) (abortion rates highest among nonwhite, poor, and unmarried).
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tion or to black market adoption. Some of the benefits of funded
adoption, however, could be extended to a broader group of
women. The costs associated with childbirth and adoption in
reality may fall more heavily on middle-income women, who may
be ineligible for public or charitable aid available to those with
lower incomes. Therefore, it might be appropriate to provide
some of these women with maternal and child health care benefits. The total cost of the program would increase as more women
were included within eligibility limits; but such an expanded
program would attract those women who could easily afford the
cost of private abortion, yet who as a matter of conscience would
prefer an inexpensive alternative.
Counseling and referral services could be made universally
available, if for no other reason than to encourage informed choice
among abortion and the alternatives, particularly adoption. In
addition, nationwide adoption referral would benefit if children
from all groups, not just from lower income groups, were included
in the pool of adoptable children. Enlarging the total pool of both
children and potential adoptive parents increases the likelihood
of early matching of parents to child.
Finally, a complete in-state funded adoption program could
be financed and administered by a state itself, without federal
financial participation or regulation. It would simply require allocation of resources at the state level. The four basic components
of the program would be included, possibly with provision for
tapping into a wider regional or national pool of children and
adoptive parents.35

Resisting any ostrich-like instinct, Congress has not hidden
its head in the sand at first sight of looming controversy in the
shape of demands for alternatives to abortion. Rather, in magpie
fashion, raiding various camps, Congress has gathered a nest-full
of programs that it hopes will provide safe haven from inclement
political weather. While these efforts provide some makeshift security for those members of Congress concerned with tempest in
the constituency, these enacted or proposed programs are less
effective as solid support for those women faced with the reality
of the need for alternatives to abortion. Nevertheless, legislative
35. The foundation for establishing such a national pool of children and adoptive
parents has ben established in title 11 of the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment and
Adoption Reform Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C.A. 9 5113, (Supp. 1979).
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attempts to ameliorate the problem are encouraging, and continued efforts by Congress are essential to an ultimate solution.
The only actual enactment by Congress in response to the
problem is title I1 of the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment
and Adoption Reform Act of 1978." While this Act is more specifically directed a t overcoming barriers to adoption of hard-to-place
its
children than a t establishing an alternative to ab~rtion,~'
value in making adoption a more attractive and effective alternative should not be underestimated.
The new Act (1) directs the Secretary of HEW to appoint an
advisory panel to study model adoption legislation and report
specific legislative proposals," (2) grants HEW the authority to
establish an administrative arrangement to coordinate all federal
adoption and foster care services,3g(3) authorizes the establishment of a nationwide, computer-based adoption information exchange system,& (4) establishes an education and training program for dissemination of adoption assistance information," and
finally, (5) funds a study, to be reported to Congress, on black
market adoption.42
These various provisions of the Act do much to focus both
congressional and administrative energies on adoption problems.
The Act recognizes the need for coordinated national action to
overcome barriers to adoption arising because of differing state
laws." It encourages counseling programs and nationwide adoption referral, with control of both resources and information centered in a single administrative entity. Most importantly, it anticipates further congressional action after the authorized studies
have been completed.
Despite the valuable contributions of the Adoption Reform
36. 42 U.S.C.A. $0 5111-5115 (Supp. 1979).
37. "It is . . . the purpose of this title to facilitate the elimination of barriers to
adoption and to provide permanent and loving home environments for children who would
benefit by adoption, particularly children with special needs . . . ." Id. 8 5111. See 124
CONG.REc. S5334-35 (daily ed. Apr. 12, 1978) (remarks of Sen. Cranston).
38. 42 U.S.C.A. 8 5112 (Supp. 1979); 124 CONG.REc. S5335 (daily ed. Apr. 12,1978)
(remarks of Sen. Cranston).
39. 42 U.S.C.A. § 5113(a) (Supp. 1979); 124 CONG.REC. S5335 (daily ed. Apr. 12,
1978) (remarks of Sen. Cranston).
40. 42 U.S.C.A. § 5113(b)(l), (3) (Supp. 1979); 124 CONG.REC.85335 (daily ed. Apr.
12, 1978) (remarks of Sen. Cranston).
41. 42 U.S.C.A. 4 5113(b)(2) (Supp. 1979); 124 CONC.REc. S5335 (daily ed. Apr. 12,
1978) (remarks of Sen. Cranston).
42. 42 U.S.C.A. 8 5114 (Supp. 1979); 124 CONG.REc. S5335 (daily ed. Apr. 12, 1978)
(remarks of Sen. Cranston).
43. 42 U.S.C.A. 8 5111 (Supp. 1979); S. REp. NO. 95-167, supra note 19, at 17-20.

376

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[I979

Act, it is in some ways a disappointment. Certain major provisions of the original legislation, S. 961," were not included in the
. ~ ~ provisions would have given
bill as passed by C o n g r e ~ sThese
grants to the states (1) to establish comprehensive adoption assistance programsMand (2) to provide "pre-natal, natal, and postpartum services to women who are voluntarily planning to place
who might otherwise have
their children for ad~ption"~~-women
"no alternative other than [to] resort to abortion or to accept
assistance from black market profiteers. "48 This second provision
of S. 961, which would have set up "a clear alternative to abortion
and black market adoption,"49was dropped in the Senate amendments to the House bill and ostensibly transferred by its sponsors
to other pending adoption reform legi~lation.~~
Other, more comprehensive; adoption reform legislation was
introduced but not acted upon by the 95th Congre~s.~'
H.R.
7200,52entitled the Public Assistance Amendments of 1977, would
have set up an entire system of adoption assistance. The bill
would have provided federal matching funds for use by states in
adoption subsidy programss3and would have increased federal
financial participation in other adoption-related child welfare
- - -- -

-

-

-

-

44. 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG.REC.S17872 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1977).
45. The House and Senate finally agreed on amendments to H.R. 6693, the House
version of S. 961. H.R. 6693--Joint Explanatory Statement of House Bill, Senate Amendment, and Compromise Agreement, 124 CONG.REC. S5335-37 (daily ed. Apr. 12, 1978),
reprinted in [I9781 U.S. CODECONG.& AD. NEWS1084, 1084-89.
46. S. 961, supra note 18, 8 103.
47. Id. $ 103(a)(2).
48. S. REP. NO. 95-167, supra note 19, at 40.
49. Id.
50. 124 CONG.REC.S5333 (daily ed. Apr. 12, 1978) (remarks of Sen. Cranston); 123
CONG.REC.S17875 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1977) (remarks of Sen. Cranston). Unfortunately,
this significant provision of S. 961 thereby disappeared into the shadowy realm of congressional committee deliberation.
51. The 95th Congress adjourned Oct. 15, 1978, allowing certain adoption-related
bills to expire. It can only be hoped that similar bills will be reintroduced in the 96th
Congress. To date, several bills regarding adoption subsidy have been introduced in the
96th Congress. See, e.g., H.R. 1291, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) (adoption subsidy); S.
966, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) (adoption assistance).
52. 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG.REC.H5805 (daily ed., June 14, 1977) (House
version); H.R. 7200,95th Cong., 1st Sess., as reported by S . REP.NO. 573,95th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1977) (Senate version) [hereinafter cited as H.R. 7200, Senate version].
. 53. See S. REP.NO. 573,95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2,22-23 (1977) (Senate version); H.R.
REP. NO. 394, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 64-65 (1977) (House version); Public Assistance
Amendments of 1977: Hearings on H.R. 7200 Before the Subcomm. on Public Assistance
of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 108-09 (statement by HEW Secretary Joseph A. Califano, Jr. concerning administration proposal) [hereinafter cited as
H. R. 7200 Hearings].
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services.54The overall goal of the adoption reform measures of
H.R. 7200 was to redirect federal money and emphasis away from
foster care assistance and toward adoption assistance."
Two other bills introduced in the 95th Congress, S. 26W6and
H.R. 12400,57were specifically aimed a t establishing programs to
provide alternatives to abortion. S. 2614 proposed to rechannel
family planning program funds to provide more emphasis on
abortion alternative programs." Although this legislation would
not fund adoption expenses directly, it would provide counseling
and referral services that emphasized adoption possibilities.
H.R. 12400 proposed a much more comprehensive abortion
alternative program. The bill anticipated federal financial participation in programs providing maternity health care benefits for
adolescent mothers, health care for their infants, and special
adoption services in these cases.59It also proposed a full range of
adoption assistance, including subsidy, to all groups." Some degree of program funding of maternity-related expenses for all
women planning to use the adoption alternative would have been
provided." Also, the bill included research grants to promote
effective abortion alternative programs," income tax benefits to
encourage adoption,63and criminal sanctions for black market
profiteering.64
H.R. 12400 is similar to the funded adoption program advocated by this Comment. The other legislative efforts are more
limited in scope than is H.R. 12400 in terms of establishing comprehensive funded adoption, yet the refined contributions of
these other proposals may have some advantage over the blunder54. See S. REP. NO. 573, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, 29, 33-34 (1977) (Senate version);
H.R. REP.NO.394,95th Cong., 1st Sess. 52-56 (1977) (House version); H.R. 7.00Hearings,
supra note 53, at 109-10 (statement by HEW Secretary Joseph A. Califano, Jr. concerning
administration proposal).
55. H.R. 7200 Hearings, supra note 53, a t 57-62 (statement of Joseph A. Califano, Jr.,
Secretary, HEW).
56. 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG.REC. S2652-53 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 1978)
[hereinafter cited as S. 26141.
57. 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) [hereinafter cited as H.R. 124001.
58. S. 2614, supra note 56, § 3. See 124 CONG.REC.S2652 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 1978)
(remarks of Sen. Helms).
59. H.R. 12400, supra note 57, at § 202.
60. Id. § 303. This section of H.R. 12400 is similar to S. 961, supra note 18.
61. H.R. 12400, supra note 57, sec. 303(b), 4 1802(a)(2). Cf. S. 961, supra note 18, §
lO3(a)(2) (provision in S. 961 of maternity-related services to women voluntarily planning
to use adoption alternative).
62. H.R. 12400, supra note 57, § § 202, 303.
63. Id. § 301.
64. Id. 8 302.
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buss approach of H.R. 12400. For example, the H.R. 7200 adoption subsidy program is much more complete than the H.R. 12400
proposal." The ideal legislative response would combine the comprehensiveness of H.R. 12400, and its focus on abortion alternatives, with certain strong, finely tuned components patterned
after the relevant proposals of S. 961, H.R. 7200, S. 2614, and the
Adoption Reform

IV. EXISTING
LAW-A MAKESHIITREMEDY
Existing social services programs a t both state and federal
levels presently provide, albeit in a disconnected fashion, much
of the specific assistance necessary for the funded adoption alternative. Yet there is no clear legislative intent that these diverse
programs be considered a direct response to the need for alternaFurthermore, the availability and impact of
tives to aborti~n.~'
these separate services vary from state to state. For these reasons,
the overall value of existing programs as providers of funded
adoption services is diminished.
These various programs can be classified into two general
groups. The first includes federally funded, state-administered
social services-titles XIX and XX of the Social Security Act,6n
for example. Although these programs differ somewhat from state
to state, all generally provide some direct assistance to the eligible woman and child in an adoptive situation. The second group,
on the other hand, is more concerned with facilitating the adoption process itself. These assistance programs derive from adoption subsidy laws now in effect in the great majority of states.
65. Compare H.R. 7200, Senate version, supra note 52, sec. 101, §§ 470-476 with H.R.
12400, supra note 57, sec. 303(b), Q 1802. The H.R.7200 adoption assistance program
includes express statutory guidelines in such areas as parent income requirements, continued Medicaid eligibility for the adopted child, and disbursement and amount of matching
funds. Also, important terms such as "child with special needs" are defined in detail. On
the other hand, H.R.12400 leaves many of the details and much of the guideline-setting
to HEW or the individual states.
66. Some of these specific proposals are: maternity health care, see S. 961, supra note
18, $ 103(a)(2);adoption subsidy, see H.R.7200, Senate version, supra note 52, sec. 101,
§§ 470-476; counseling on alternatives to abortion, see S. 2614, supra note 56, Q 3(a);
funding of alternatives-to-abortion projects, see id. 3(b); and nationwide computerized
adoption referral services, see 42 U.S.C.A. 8 5113 (Supp. 1979).
67. For examples of programs with legislative intent directed at alternatives to abortion, see S. 2614, supra note 56, Q 2; H.R.12400, supra note 57.
68. 42 U.S.C. $ 5 301-1397f (1976).

FUNDED ADOPTION

A. Federally Funded Programs
1. Title XIX of the Social Security Act-Medicaid

Title XIX," more commonly known as Medicaid, provides
substantial federal financial participation70in state medical assistance programs. Medicaid is available in some form in virtually
all states." Although federal regulations provide some overall
consistency, states are allowed the flexibility necessary to administer their specific medical assistance plans. Detailed regulations
and eligibility requirements, therefore, tend to vary, within broad
federal guidelines, from state to state.72If a woman meets the
eligibility requirements in her state,73she can receive Medicaid
payments to cover the medical expenses of pregnancy and childbirth. In addition, a child born to a Medicaid-eligible mother can
receive health care assistance payments." Two of the components
of funded adoption-maternity care and infant health care-are
69. 42 U.S.C. $9 1396-1396k (1976).
70. 42 U.S.C. 54 1396b, 1396d (1976), as amended by Social Security Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 95-210, § 2, 91 Stat. 1485 (1977).
71. Arizona's Medicaid program, scheduled to go into effect in mid-1977, was postponed by failure on the part of the state legislature to appropriate the necessary funds.
See Cochise County v. Dandoy, 116 Ariz. 53, 567 P.2d 1182 (1977).
72. The federal statute lists general categories of medical assistance that must be
provided in a qualified state plan. 42 U.S.C. § § 1396a(a)(13),1396d(a) (1976), as amended
by Social Security Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 95-210, § 2, 91 Stat. 1485 (1977). In
addition, the federal statute has certain general requirements for eligibility, administration, and other procedural aspects. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a (1976).
73. Under basic federal guidelines, eligible Medicaid recipients must be either
"categorically needy" or "medically needy." See 42 U.S.C. $9 1396a(a)(10), 1396d(a)
ON HEALTH
AND ENVIRONMENT
OF THE
(1976); 42 C.F.R. § 435.1 (1978); STAFFOF SUBCOMM.
HOUSECOMM.ON INTERSTATE
AND FOREIGN
COMMERCE,
9 5 CONG.,
~ ~ ST SESS.,DATAON THE
MEDICAID
PROGRAM:
ELIGIBILITY
SERVICES,
EXPENDITURES,
FISCAL
YEARS1966-77, a t 1-2,
23-25 (Comm. Print 1977) [hereinafter cited as MEDICAID
DATA]."Categorically needy"
includes individuals already receiving welfare aid under the federal AFDC (aid to families
with dependent children) program, 42 U.S.C. § § 601-611 (1976), or individuals already
receiving welfare aid under the federal SSI (supplemental security income-for the aged,
blind, or permanently disabled) program, 42 U.S.C. $ 8 1381-1383 (1976). See 42 C.F.R. $
435.4 (1978); MEDICAID
DATA,supra, a t 1. "Medically needy" includes those who would
be eligible for federal welfare (AFDC or SSI) but for failure to meet the low-income and
resources requirements, yet who lack sufficient income and resources to pay for medical
services. Medicaid coverage of the medically needy is optional with the state. See 42
DATA,supra, a t 1. Thus, generally speaking, Medicaid is
C.F.R. $ 435.4 (1978); MEDICAID
only available to the aged, the blind, the permanently disabled, low-income families, or
children under age 21. For a more comprehensive discussion of Medicaid eligibility, see
Butler, The Medicaid Program: Current Statutory Requirements and Judicial
REV.7, 8-12 (1974).
Interpretations, 8 CLEARINGHOUSE
74. A child could be eligible either as a dependent of an AFDC family, or if the
mother were not covered under AFDC, then as a child under 21 qualifying on the basis of
financial need. See Butler, supra note 73, at 8-9.

.
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thus .available, at least to some degree, through Medicaid programs.
Health care assistance as provided by Medicaid programs is
a clear benefit to many pregnant women who might otherwise be
financially unable to continue on to childbirth and adoptive
placement of the child. However, a state's Medicaid eligibility
requirements regarding age, income, or familial status may foreclose this benefit to other women who are under economic pressure to find an inexpensive means of resolving the problem of
unwanted pregnancy. Many women technically ineligible for
Medicaid may still be unable to readily afford the costs of childbirth and infant care, especially given the risk of expensive complications and the chance that the child may for some reason turn
out to be difficult to place for adoption. These burdensome financial risks may be so great as to make legal abortion, or the more
desperate alternatives of illegal abortion or black market adoption, the only economically safe choices for many middle- and
lower middle-income women. An additional disadvantage is that
Medicaid is generally unavailable to single women over age
t w e n t y - ~ n e In
. ~ ~a comprehensive funded adoption program,
where eligibility requirements would be tailored to the goal of
providing an abortion alternative for all women in financial need,
ideally these particular gaps in coverage would not exist.?"

2. Title X X of the Social Security Act-social

services

Title XXT7is a flexible program that provides federal grants
to states on a matching funds basis for a wide range of social
servi~es.'~
Generally, title XX is intended to finance many services that may not be available through other programs like Medi ~ a i d . 'Thus,
~
if a particular state had no other program source
for these expenses, title XX could fund nonmedical maternity
75. See note 73 supra. Presumably, a large percentage of "unwanted pregnancies"
occur among single women over age 21-exactly that group excluded from Medicaid
coverage.
76. For example, funded adoption eligibility could depend entirely on income and
resources of applicants. Income and resources requirements could be set high enough that
women who are not considered low-income level, yet who would be unable to assume the
costs of childbirth (lower middle- and some middle-income level) would receive program
benefits. Marital status and age would be irrelevant.
77. 42 U.S.C. $5 1397-1397f (1976).
OF AMERICA,
INC.,USING
CnTLE
78. See 42 U.S.C. § 1397 (1976); CHILDWWARE LEAGUE
XX TO SERVECHILDREN
AND YOUTH2-4 (1975) [hereinafter cited as USINGTiTLE XX].
79. 42 U.S.C. § 1397a(a)(7)-(8), (lo), (12) (1976). See also 45 C.F.R. 88 228.40-.43
(1978); USINGTITLE
XX, supra note 78, a t 12-16.
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expenses, such as nutritional cares0and routine child care,s1as
well as certain adoption costs.82Particularly, title XX could provide a valuable source of funding for adoption counseling and
referral," and possibly even for direct adopt'.on subsidie~.~'
Because of its flexible structure, title XX is ideally suited as a
possible source for many of the necessary funds not otherwise
available to eligible womens5seeking to place a child for adoption.
3. Title IV-B of the Social Security Act-child

welfare

Title IV-Bs6grants matching federal funds to state programs
that provide basic child welfare services.87Available under this
title are funds for some adoption-related services, most notably
counseling and referral and foster care services." Also, although
this program is not designed to provide direct adoption subsidy,
. it does cover most one-time adoption expenses," such as legal
fees, if eligibility requirements are met."
80. See 42 U.S.C. 8 1397a(a)(l) (1976); USINGTITLEXX, supra note 78, a t 11, 43.
XX,
81. See 42 U.S.C. § 1397a(a)(l) (1976); 45 C.F.R. § 228.42 (1978); USINGTITLE
supra note 78, a t 10-11, 42.
82. See 42 U.S.C. 9 1397a(a)(l) (1976); S. 961 Hearings, supra note 3, a t 29 (statement of Arabella Martinez, Assistant Secretary for Human Development, HEW); USING
TITLEXX, supra note 78, at 21-22,42; Mott, Foster Care and Adoption: Some Key Policy
Issues, in Opportunities for Adoption Act of 1977: Hearings on S. 961 Before the Subcomm. on Child and Human Development of the Senate Comm. on Human Resources,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 447 (1977).
83. See 42 U.S.C. § 1397a(a)(l) (1976); USINGTITLEXX, supra note 78, at 21-22.
84. See Note, The Implementation of Subsidized Adoption Programs: A Preliminary
Study, 15 J . FAM.L. 732, 748 n.46, 750 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Preliminary Study].
85. In general, eligibility for title XX services is based on income level or previous
eligibility for other federal welfare programs. 42 U.S.C. 4 1397 a(a)(4), (5) (1976). Services
may be extended to individuals with higher incomes upon payment of a fee "reasonably
related to income." Id. § l397a(a)(6). See also 45 C.F.R. 00 228.60-$6 (1978); USINGTITLE
XX, supra note 78, a t 6-9. However, information or referral services, family planning
services, and services directed a t preventing child abuse or neglect are free to all income
groups. 42 U.S.C. § 1397a(a)(6) (1976).
86. 42 U.S.C. $8 620-626 (1976).
87. See 42 U.S.C. $4 620, 625 (1976); 45 C.F.R. 4 220.62(d) (1978); Mott, supra note
82, a t 477-78.
88. See 42 U.S.C. § 625 (1976); 45 C.F.R. § 220.62(d) (1978); Mott, supra note 82, a t
477-78.
89. S. REP.NO. 573, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1977); Mott, supra note 82, a t 477.
90. Generally, eligibility is based on need for child welfare services, with special
consideration given to children and unmarried mothers for whom the state has assumed .
public welfare responsibility. 45 C.F.R. 8 220.62(b) (1978).
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Title V of the Social Security Act-maternal and child health
care
Title V," the Maternal and Child Health Care Act, gives
annual allotments to the states to be used to promote the general
improvements of maternal and child health.g2Title V specifically
funds maternity counseling services and health and nutrition information centers? It is also designed as a source of funding for
child health care, especially for handicapped children.g4Although
limited in both scope and amount of federal funding, this program may be useful in filling gaps not covered by other state
programs.

4.

5. Title X of the Public Health Service Act-family planning

Title Xg5
grants federal funds to both state and private nonprofit organizations that provide family planning services." Although these programs are generally oriented toward prevention
of unwanted pregnancy, they nevertheless could be expanded to
provide adoption-oriented counseling that directed women to
adoption benefits from collateral state and federal programs."
Perhaps the major significance of title X in this respect is that
its services are generally available without regard to income or
other eligibility factors. g8

B. Adoption Subsidy Laws
1. Existing state programs-subsidized adoption
Over forty states have statutes that can be termed "adoption
91. 42 U.S.C. $8 701-716 (1976).
92. See 42 U.S.C. Q$ 701, 705(a)(6)-(14), 708-710 (1976), as amended by Health
Services Extension Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-83, $309(a), 91 Stat. 383 (1977); 42 C.F.R.
99 5la.lOlCj), .128-.I32 (1978).
93. See 42 U.S.C. §$ 705(a)(8), (12), (14), 708 (1976); 42 C.F.R. § § 51a.l01Cj), .I28
(1978).
94. See 42 U.S.C. 44 705(a)(5)-(7), (9)-(lo), (12)-(13), 709-710 (1976); 42 C.F.R. $8
5la.lOlCj)-(k), .129-.I32 (1978).
95. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300 to 300a-8 (1976).
96. 42 U.S.C. $8 300, 300a (1976); 42 C.F.R. 8 59.5(b)-Cj) (1978).
97. This redirection of counseling and referral is legislatively proposed by S. 2614,
supra note 56. However, there is apparently nothing in the present statute that would
disallow minor administrative readjustments of counseling and referral emphasis to include adoption counseling. Cf. 42 C.F.R. $ 59.5(e), (i) (1978) (provision for refenal to and
coordination with other social and medical services agencies providing family planning
services).
98. However, services are free only to low-income individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 300a-4(c)
(1976); 42 C.F.R. 88 59.2(e), .5(a)(4)-(5) (1978).
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subsidy l a ~ s . " ~ ~ l t h o uthe
g h details of the different laws vary
greatly, all share a similar purpose-to facilitate placement of all
children in need of adoption by increasing the number of suitable
adoptive homes. loo
The adoption subsidy concept is fairly simple. Subsidy payments are made out of public funds to the adoptive parents for
the full or partial support of the adopted child.lOlThe legal status
of the child is not in any way affected by the subsidy.'" The
subsidy is not an award or incentive to adopt.lo3The assistance
is meant only to promote placement of the child into a loving,
stable home in cases where the financial situation of the adoptive
parents would not otherwise permit the adoption. Financial inability to adopt can arise either because the income of the parents
is insufficient to support the normal expenses of childrearing or
because special needs of the child, such as a physical handicap
requiring expensive medical care, demand more than the potential parents' otherwise adequate income can provide. In either
case, the goal is to ensure that all children, regardless of financial
factors, will find adoptive homes.
As mentioned, the specific aspects of state adoption subsidy
programs vary. Commonly, however, states provide assistance for
both normal maintenance and medical costs.lo4Eligibility requirements in many states insist that the child be "hard to
place"lo5 and already eligible for assistance under other public
programs.106Assistance is generally administered in the form of
direct payments to the adoptive parents, who are contractually
obligated to use the subsidies for specific support expenses.ln
Subsidies can also take the form of a continuation of previous
99. Katz, Subsidized Adoption in America, 10 F a .L.Q.1 , 7 (1976). For a listing and
description of most of these state adoption subsidy laws, see S. 961 Hearings, supra note
3, a t 341-52 (report of Jean Yavis Jones, Education and Public Welfare Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress). See also id. a t 20 (statement of ~ r a b e l l a
Martinez, Assistant Secretary for Human Development, HEW).
100. See, e.g., S. 961, supra note 18, § 101 (Findings and Declaration of Purpose); S.
REP.NO. 95-167, supra note 19, a t 21; Katz, supra note 99, a t 7.
101. See generally MCNAMARA,
supra note 27, a t 111-13; Katz, supra note 99, at 4.
102. Katz, supra note 99, a t 6.
103. Id.
104. See S. 961 Hearings, supra note 3, a t 339 (Jones research report); Preliminary
Study, supra note 84, at 739. For studies comparing the provisions of various state adoption subsidy laws, see S. 961 Hearings, supra note 3, a t 353-60.
105. S. 961 Hearings, supra note 3, a t 339 (Jones research report); Preliminary Study,
supra note 84, at 738.
106. Preliminary Study, supra note 84, a t 738.
107. See, e.g., Katz, supra note 99, a t 39-41.
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assistance payments for which the child was eligible, notably
Medicaid. loS
Adoption subsidy, as presently administered by the states,
focuses on placement of children with special needs, children who
may have been in foster care or institutional care for some time,
even for years.lo9The focus generally has not been directed toward
cases where mothers are hoping to place newborn children for
immediate adoption. However, there is no reason that subsidy
payments cannot be provided in this situation as well. Normally,
placing a newborn infant is not difficult, and therefore subsidies
would not be needed. But in those few cases where the infant is
hard-to-place, for whatever reason, adoption subsidy can ensure
placement, perhaps by allowing more low-income minority families to become eligible to adopt a minority child, or by making it
possible for a concerned and able couple to adopt a child with a
costly medical handicap in spite of their modest income.
2.

The Model Act-impetus

and example

A Model State Subsidized Adoption Act has been drafted?
This Model Act encourages appropriate adoption by supplementing state adoption programs with a public financial adoption subsidy program.lll The Model Act generally focuses on the financial
needs of the child, rather than the financial status of the parents.l12 A wide range of "special needs" will qualify a child for
assistance.l13However, built into the Act is a requirement that a
full attempt to place the child without the subsidy be made before payments will be authorized.ll4 Additionally, as is the case
in most states, the Model Act contemplates a contractual arrangement with the adoptive parents before they can receive the
payments. 115
Many states now have provisions similar in some respects to
those of the Model Act, but it seems likely that unless some
leadership a t the federal level encourages the states to meet uni108. See 42 C.F.R. $436.222 (1978); S . REP.NO. 573,95th Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1977);
Preliminary Study, supra note 84, at 744 n.40.
109. See generally S. 961 Hearings, supra note 3, at 339-40 (Jones research report);
Katz, supra note 99, at 3-7; Preliminary Study, supra note 84, at 737-39.
110. See Katz, supra note 99, at 7-16.
ADOFTIONA m 8 1).
111. Id. at 11. (MODELSTATESUBSIDIZED
112. Id. at 8, 13-14 (MODELSTATESUBSIDIZED
ADOPTION
ACT $ 4).
ADOFTION
A m $ 2).
113. Id. at 8, 11-12 (MODELSTATESUBSIDIZED
ADOPTION
ACT 9 4).
114. Id. at 8, 13-14 (MODELSTATESUBSIDIZED
ADOPTION
A m $ 5).
115. Id. at 8, 14-15 (MODELSTATESUBSIDIZED

FUNDED ADOPTION

form guidelines, such as those of the Model Act, the present wide
array of differing state adoption subsidy laws will continue. A
federally established adoption subsidy plan, patterned after the
Model Act and enacted as part of a funded adoption program,
could serve to bring about uniformity merely by making funds
available to those state plans that conform to federal standards.

C. Federal Benefits and State Subsidies Corn bined
In many states, a creative social services organization may
presently be able to package individual abortion alternative
plans. By carefully combining the benefits available under the
various existing federal assistance programs with benefits from
state adoption subsidy plans, an organization could put together
assistance plans that, in individual cases, may provide most of
. the major advantages of funded adoption. In some cases, limited
state assistance can be supplemented with assistance from charitable organizations, which often have established programs that
are of great benefit to unwed mothers.l16Nevertheless, all of these
possibilities require an individual approach and may not be adequate for every woman in need of funded adoption services, simply because complete assistance may be impossible to piece together in every case.
A comprehensive funded adoption program need not be administered on an assembly line basis, oblivious to individual situations. However, the uniform nature and availability of all the
components of assistance within a single, understandable, federally supported program would discourage inequality of administration. By comparison, the piecing together necessary to provide
full assistance under existing programs seems an unwieldy and
confusing process, perhaps not worth the effort of a woman totally
discouraged by the complexity of social services administration.

This Comment has urged the legislative enactment of funded
adoption from a removed perspective, as if legislators would inev-8
itably be impressed with the proposal to the point that further
justification would be unnecessary. Obviously, the situation is
more complex. Congress and state legislatures must weigh the
116. See, e.g., Searle, Adoption Program Aids Mother, Child (1973) (pamphlet available from The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, Social Services Dep't, Salt
Lake City, Utah).
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benefits of providing this essential service against potential disadvantages such as excessive cost and implementation difficulties, taking into consideration the competing interests of the various constituent groups that might favor or oppose funded adoption. Duplication of legislation must be avoided by a review of
existing programs. Overall policy must be examined and debated.
Although all competing viewpoints on the important issues in this
legislative balancing process cannot be discussed adequately
here, certain areas of likely difference of opinion should be mentioned. These are the broad issues of cost, implementation, and
constitutionality.

A.

Cost

Perhaps the most formidable barrier to any new social legislation is cost. Taxpayers and legislators alike are concerned with
whether the proposed program will prove worthwhile, or merely
wasteful. The worry is whether it will succumb to the chronic and
costly ills of bloated budget and spending waste, or whether the
new program will deliver in a cost-conservative manner services
that are imperatively needed.
A budget report is neither attempted nor feasible in this
Comment, but it should be noted that much of the money necessary for funded adoption is already being spent for similar services. All of the various components of the program-counseling
and referral, maternity care, infant care, and adoption subsidy-presently exist, although in separate programs, either a t
the federal or state level.lL7If these disjointed efforts were simply
consolidated into a single program, total cost could conceivably
decrease. Indeed, it has been estimated that a redirection of emphasis would result either in no extra cost or a budget cut in the
areas of adoption subsidylls and counseling and referral.llg
Nevertheless, total optimism may be inappropriate. It seems
likely that even though a comprehensive funded adoption program may be a more efficient use of money already being spent
117. See Section IV-C supra.
118. S. REP.NO. 573, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 115 (1977) (Senate Comm. on Finance
estimates on adoption assistance costs under H.R. 7200); id. a t 123-25 (Congressional
Budget Office estimates on adoption assistance costs under H.R. 7200). These estimates
assume that adoption subsidy costs will be offset by funds that would otherwise go to
foster care payments.
119. Emphasizing adoption and other abortion alternatives, instead of abortion,
should not result in increased counseling time or costs. See 124 CONG.REC.S2652 (daily
ed. Mar. 1, 1978) (remarks of Sen. Helms).
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for similar services, the eventual cost of administeriqg the program so as to actually fulfill its purpose-provision of an abortion
alternative-would increase above present budget levels. Simply
by becoming an attractive alternative, the program would encourage more women to make use of the available assistance,
women who might otherwise not avail themselves of public funds
for these special needs. On the other hand, by shunting children
who would normally be expected to become part of welfareeligible families out of the welfare system and into adoptive
homes, where some if not all the cost of their support could be
borne by the adoptive parents, arguably the public would ultimately save a great deal of social welfare money.120
Whichever view is taken, funded adoption clearly would
demand a large budget.121Whether this budget can be built up
by reallocating present, less efficient funding, or whether new
resources will need to be tapped, is a question answerable only
after extensive study. In any case, the vital need for this program
should prove sufficient to motivate sponsoring members of Congress and state legislatures to devise creative and efficient proposals to meet the expenses of funded adoption.

B. Implementation
A complete, integrated funded adoption program should not
present insurmountable problems of implementation. A pervasive framework that provides all facets of social welfare services
has existed for decades a t both state and federal levels. The
wealth of experience of federal and state administrative entities
in this area will prove useful in building a new system for delivery
of the funded adoption benefits. Since the major target group of
funded adoption services will be women or families already acquainted with social services administration, there should be no
real difficulty in establishing early awareness of the benefits of
the new program. However, to ensure the effectiveness resulting
from the comprehensive nature of the program, which is its major
advantage over the present disjointed system, full implementa120. Opponents of federal or state cutoffs of Medicaid funding of elective abortion
also argue that future welfare rolls must be kept free of unwanted welfare children. See
Lincoln, supra note 11, a t 214; 123 CONC.
REC.E4940 (daily ed. July 28, 1977) (remarks
of Rep. Edwards).
121. Depending on eligibility requirements, the overall budget could be expanded or
contracted. If all women, regardless of economic need, were eligible for part or all of' the
funded adoption services, see Section II-E supra, the total cost would be significantly
greater than if benefits were limited to needy women.
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tion should be a primary goal of administrative personnel. Piecemeal implementation merely postpones this effectiveness.
Duplication of services could be another barrier to smooth
implementation. However, a legislative and administrative review of present programs may obviate this problem. Also, a wellorganized counseling network, which is the first contact point for
those using the program, would be a practical guard against most
instances of duplication, and the confusion and budget waste that
result.

C.

Constitutionality

The constitutionality of funded adoption, as a specifically
intended alternative to elective abortion, has of course not been
tested in the courts. Nevertheless, a conscientious legislator will
be concerned about the constitutional implications of funded
adoption legislation, particularly those stemming from the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. The major concern is whether a state, partaking of federal monies, may favor
mothers who choose normal childbirth and adoption over those
who prefer to terminate pregnancy through abortion by providing
economic assistance in a funded adoption program. This question
is especially pertinent where a state has refused to fund elective
abortion. 122
Although this issue has not been litigated in the context of
funded adoption, it has been considered by the courts in the
related area of funded abortion. The Supreme Court in Maher v.
was faced with the almost identical question of whether the
equal protection clause prohibits a state from refusing to pay for
nontherapeutic abortions for indigent women, while continuing to
provide assistance to eligible mothers carrying their children to
term.124The lower court had overturned a state regulation that
restricted Medicaid assistance for abortions to those found to be
"medically necessary"125on the ground that such restrictions were
not "equally applicable to medicaid payments for childbirth."lZ6
122. See note 7-10 and accompanying text supra.
123. 432 U.S. 464 (1977). The companion cases to Maher were Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S.
438 (1977) (state regulation prohibiting Medicaid payments for nontherapeutic abortions
not a contravention of title XIX of Social Security Act, the Medicaid statute) and Poelker
v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977) (refusal of city to provide nontherapeutic abortions in publicly
financed hospital not unconstitutional).
124. 432 U.S. at 468-69.
125. Id. at 466 & n.2.
126. Roe v. Norton, 408 F. Supp. 660, 665 (D. Conn. 1975), reu'd sub nom. Maher v.
Roe,432 U.S. 464 (1977).
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Justice Powell, writing for the majority,127found that the
challenged Connecticut regulation did not violate the fourteenth
amendment's equal protection clause.lB In analyzing the equal
protection issue, the Court applied the usual two-tiered test.I2W'
either a suspect classification or an infringement of a fundamental right is found, then the state must demonstrate a compelling
state interest that outweighs the negative effects of the classification scheme in order to overcome the constitutional challenge. If
there is no suspect classification or infringement of a fundamental right, then the state's classification scheme must merely be
"rationally related" to a legitimate state interest.130
The challengers in Maher pointed out that the Connecticut
regulation classified pregnant women into two groups-those who
preferred to give birth normally and those who chose to abort.
The classification scheme, they argued, both discriminated
against the latter group of women in violation of equal protection
of the law and unduly interfered with their right, recognized in
127. The decision was six to three. Justice Brennan, in his dissent, criticized the
majority for ignoring the due process considerations. He argued that the denial of elective
abortion Medicaid assistance was a direct infringement of an indigent woman's privacy
right to obtain an abortion. 432 U.S. at 484-85 (Brennan, J., dissenting). According to Roe
v. Wade, Justice Brennan pointed out, this right is rooted in the due process clause. See
id. However, even assuming the validity of Justice Brennan's criticism of the Maher
result, it would be inapplicable in the funded adoption situation, where the concern is not
whether the state is infringing a poor woman's right to abort by denying needed financial
assistance. Rather, the separate concern is whether the state may financially favor
alternatives to abortion.
Justice Marshall and Justice Blackmun each wrote a separate dissenting opinion
applicable to all three companion cases. Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438,454-63 (1977). Justice
Marshall once again advocated implementation of his "sliding scale" approach to equal
protection adjudication. 432 U.S. a t 457-58 (1977)(Marshall, J., dissenting). See generally
Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Forward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a
Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV.L. REV.1, 17-18 (1972).
None of the other justices joined in Marshall's dissent.
Justice Blackmun drew attention to the human elements involved in the Maher
result, pointing out that for many poor women the holding of the Court signifies the
destruction of the only reasonable solution to unwanted pregnancy. 432 U.S. a t 462
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). Funded adoption, as advocated by this Comment, would
provide another answer for these women.
128. 432 U.S. a t 470. For a more complete analysis of the holding of the Court, see
Hardy, Privacy and Public Funding: Maher v. Roe as the Interaction of Roe v. Wade and
Dandridge v. Williams, 18 ARIZ.L. REV.903 (1976); Comment, State Funding of Elective
Abortion: The Supreme Court Defers to the Legislature, 46 U . CIN. L. REV.1003 (1977).
129. 432 U S . a t 470 (citing San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17
(1973)). For a comprehensive analysis of the two-tiered approach to equal protection, and
the trends toward a "newer" equal protection, see Gunther, supra note 127.
130. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976); San
Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973).
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Roe v. Wade, 131 to choose an elective ab0rti0n.l~~
The challengers
contended that because of the nature of the right involved, the
heavy burden of showing a compelling state interest should fall
upon the state-a burden that Connecticut would not be able to
carry.lS The Supreme Court, however, found Connecticut's classification scheme not "suspect," and therefore did not require the
state to show a compelling state interest.'" The Court held that
even though a fundamental right of privacy was involved, this
right was not infringed by the state scheme.135The Court emphasized that Roe v. Wade and other right of privacy cases had not
established an absolute constitutional right to an abortion, as the
challengers had argued. Rather, the cases held that a state may
not establish an "unduly burdensome interference" with a
woman's decision to abort Connecticut's regulation was an
encouragement of childbirth, not an absolute or undue barrier to
ab0rti0n.l~~
Therefore, the deferential rational basis test, rather
than the compelling state interest test, was proper.13"
Alternatively, argued the challengers, the state regulation
could not stand even under the rational basis test. Connecticut's
assertion that prohibiting elective abortion payments furthered
the state's interest in conserving public funds was characterized
as "wholly chimerical."139The Court, however, emphasized a further legitimate purpose for the regulation-a strong state interest
in encouraging childbirth?" This purpose, "an interest honored
131. 410 U.S. 113, 152-54 (1973).
132. See 432 U.S. at 470; Brief for Appellee at 15-16, 18, Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464
(1977).
133. Brief for Appellee at 21, 33, Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
134. 432 U.S. a t 470-71 (citing San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 29
(1973); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970)).
135. Id. a t 471-74.
136. Id. a t 474.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 477-78. The test, as articulated by the Court, required that the state's
classification scheme be " 'rationally related' to a 'constitutionally permissible7 purpose."
Id. a t 478 (quoting Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972)).
139. Brief for Appellee a t 27, Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (quoting the trial
court, Roe v. Norton, 408 F. Supp. 660, 664 (D. Conn. 1975)). See id. a t 28, 33-34. For a
better argument than Connecticut's that a state will save money by refusing to fund
elective abortions, see Hardy, supra note 128, a t 924-32.
140. 432 U.S. a t 478-79. In a footnote the Court also suggested that a state's
"legitimate demographic concerns about its rate of population growth" may be a further
legitimate state purpose. Id. a t 478 n.11. Neither the interests in encouraging childbirth
nor the interests in population growth rate were raised by the parties. The interests in
state finances and maternal health were the only state purposes mentioned by the lower
court. Roe v. Norton, 408 F. Supp. 660, 664 & n.4 (D. Conn. 1975).
Possibly, the state did not urge "encouraging childbirth" as its purpose because this
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over the centuries, ""I was legitimate and rationally furthered by
making Medicaid funds available for childbirth costs while denyAlthough the Court did not
ing payments for elective ab0rti0ns.l~~
directly so state, the concept that discouraging abortions also
furthers the state policy of encouraging childbirth is inherent in
the ana1y~is.l~~
Finally, the Court noted in upholding the Connecticut regulation that states are accorded a "wider latitude in
choosing among competing demands for limited public funds"Id4
and that sensitive policy decisions involved in this area are most
appropriately reserved to the legislative branch.141
The constitutional issues involved in a state's enactment of
funded adoption can be resolved using the analysis of the Maher
Court. In the funded adoption situation, the right of a woman to
have an elective abortion would be no more infringed than in the
Maher situation, and the compelling state interest test would be
inappropriate. In the absence of state funding of abortion, the
fact that poor women would be encouraged, in an economic sense,
to avail themselves of the adoption alternative does not violate
any fundamental right. As Justice Powell pointed out in Maher,
that the state "may have made childbirth a more attractive alternative, thereby influencing the woman's decision,
impose[s] no restriction on access to abortions that was not already there."14VI'he economic condition that may foreclose elective abortion is "neither created nor in any way affected"147by a
funded adoption program.
Funded adoption passes scrutiny under the less demanding

...

interest seemed so similar to the state interest in the protection of the unborn child, an
interest that became sufficiently compelling to overcome the woman's right to decide on
abortion only after the stage of viability, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. a t 163-64. However, the
Court in Maher found this state interest in "protecting the potential life of the fetus" t o
be the source of the interest in encouraging childbirth. 432 U S . a t 478; Beal v. Doe, 432
U.S. 438, 445-56 (1977).
141. 432 U.S. a t 478 (footnote omitted).
142. Id. a t 478-79.
143. Perhaps the Court shied away from this concept because its rationale for allowing minimal scrutiny depended on a showing of noninterference by the state with the
woman's right to terminate her pregnancy. Justice Powell noted that encouragement of
childbirth was no obstacle to a woman seeking an abortion. 432 U S . a t 474-75. However,
positive discouragement of the exercise of that right seems slightly more suggestive of
"direct state interference with a protected activity," id. a t 475. See also, Note, State
Funding of Nontherapeutic Abortions, Medicaid Plans, Equal Protection, Right to Choose
an Abortion, 11 AKRONL. REV.345, 354 (1977).
144. 432 U.S. a t 479 (footnote omitted).
145. Id. at 479-80.
146. Id. a t 474.
147. Id.
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test of rationality because the same legitimate state interest, encouraging normal childbirth, is a t stake. By funding the expenses
of pregnancy, delivery, child care, and adoption, the state rationally attempts to further this strong interest. This particular
means is at least as effective as simply cutting off abortion assistance. By establishing an economically attractive alternative to
abortion, the state not only encourages those who would choose
adoption anyway, but also those who might otherwise resort to
abortion, to take advantage of the state program, thereby increasing the number of live births in comparison to the number of
abortions.
Funded adoption, under the principles stated by the Supreme Court in Maher v. Roe, would in no way violate the fourteenth amendment guarantee of equal protection. Even though
the arguments of those preferring not to favor childbirth and
adoption over elective abortion are entitled to full consideration
by a legislature, in the end these arguments fail as constitutional
objections; they become instead policy arguments to be weighed
in the legislative balancing process against the many policy factors in favor of providing a much needed alternative to elective
abortion.

VI. CONCLUSION
Two complex factors have combined to limit the alternatives
available to women with unwanted pregnancies. First, economic
pressure from high costs of pregnancy and childbirth, most severe
in the case of indigent women, pushes forcefully toward the less
expensive alternative of abortion. In some cases, especially after
the recent cutoff of federal and most state funding of elective
abortion, the cost of private abortion itself may increase the pressure, leaving many women with no economically feasible choices
other than illegal, "back alley" abortion or black market adoption. Second, public institutions and modern society itself tend
to urge the simple and expedient solution-abortion-over
the
complex and lengthy process of childbirth and adoption. The
women most affected by these two factors in combination are
those who are morally opposed to elective abortion, yet who are
economically disadvantaged to the degree that acceptable alternatives are nonexistent.
Funded adoption is an escape from this cul-de-sac of the
conscience. Such a program, enacted at the federal level and
administered by states on a matching-funds basis, would provide
(1) counseling and referral services; (2) assistance payments for
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costs of pregnancy, childbirth, and postpartum care to eligible
women; (3) maintenance and medical care for the newborn infant; and (4) adoption expenses, to include direct subsidies to
potential adoptive parents, if necessary to facilitate prompt adoption of handicapped, minority, or other hard-to-place infants. By
removing the economic obstacles to the adoption alternative and
by ensuring prompt and appropriate placement of the child,
funded adoption will serve as the much needed alternative for
many women.
Congress has not been insensitive to the need for abortion
alternatives. The Adoption Reform Act of 1978, as well as several
bills introduced in the 95th Congress, have evidenced the concern
of many members of Congress. However, a complete program of
funded adoption has yet to be approved. Other programs, such
as Medicaid and title XX of the Social Security Act, when grafted
onto state adoption subsidy programs already in existence in
most states, provide makeshift solutions resembling the funded
adoption concept. But these efforts must be carried out on an
.individual case basis, often a t added expense, confusion, and
frustration to both the government agencies and the women they
are trying to assist.
A comprehensive funded adoption program, if enacted,
would not be immune from the normal problems of cost and
implementation. However, well-planned legislation and highquality administration of the program could minimize these
problems. Also, a conscientious legislator's concerns about the
constitutional implications of a program that tends to favor childbirth over abortion should be assuaged by the recent Supreme
Court decision in Maher v. Roe, which held that a state can
constitutionally refuse to fund elective abortion while continuing
to pay for childbirth expenses under Medicaid. The equal protection issue in a funded adoption program is nearly identical. A
legislator can be confident that funded adoption does not violate
the fourteenth amendment. On the contrary, funded adoption
offers its own "equal protection"-a protection that shields those
women who are willing to accept the necessary travail in hopes
of gaining the luxury of a triumph of conscience over severe economic and social pressure to abort. In an abortion-conscious society, this rare triumph deserves respect.

Frederick R. Vandeveer

